DOJ Unveils New Corporate Enforcement Strategy, Whistleblower Reward Program Targeting Tariff Evaders
Since the start of 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has rolled out significant updates to its internal protocols aimed at streamlining the agency’s approach to the handling of corporate crime. This series of moves has aligned the department with greater efforts taken by the Trump Administration to curb white-collar criminal activity and terrorism financing exploits both domestically and abroad. The department continues to be proactive in this regard, and on May 12 th, the head of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, Matthew R. Galeotti, introduced a revised Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) and a restructured whistleblower program that analysts believe will provide a major boost to the department’s enforcement figures moving forward.
Originally created during the final year of the Biden Administration, the previous iteration of the DOJ’s corporate whistleblower award program too aimed to gather information about financial and corporate misconduct, albeit with additional stipulations. The Biden-era program offered potential monetary awards for qualified whistleblowers (in cases where the DOJ would successfully bring about an enforcement action with a monetary forfeiture greater than $1 million) providing information on criminal abuses of the U.S. financial system, foreign and domestic corruption, and healthcare fraud cases, effectively filling the gaps between similar programs offered by other domestic agencies (i.e. the IRS, SEC, CFTC). While a step in the right direction with respect to incentivizing greater information sharing between involved parties, the pilot program was also criticized for its limitations. These included a cap placed on financial awards available to whistleblowers.
Under the original DOJ criteria, a whistleblower would not be entitled to any additional compensation based on recoveries that topped $500 million and would be subjected to a 5% cap on recoveries above $100 million. 1 This meant that involved whistleblowers were taking great risks to only receive a small reward in comparison to previous awards distributed by both the SEC’s and the CFTC’s respective whistleblower programs seen in the recent past. Others offered that the program could actually de-incentivize whistleblowers and companies to report misconduct, given that the regulations fell short in allowing whistleblowers to maintain anonymity if the Justice Department explicitly requested their identity to be revealed during their proceedings.
The new plan, titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime” emphasizes streamlined investigations, increased reliance on whistleblower tips and a recalibration of prosecutorial focus.2 Under the revised CEP, the focus of enforcement actions and subsequent awards will be shifted onto crimes with more significant national security, consumer safety, and economic implications, while also factoring in more recent developments in the realms of sanctions, immigration and international tariffs. Relevant to the financial sector, these new priorities will also place a premium on cases involving complex money laundering operations, digital asset fraud, and cases where there is corporate support for foreign terrorist organizations and/or cartels. Under the expanded program, whistleblowers will now be eligible to receive substantial financial rewards for relevant information provided in relation to the aforementioned areas, including gang/cartel financing, sanctions violations, and procurement fraud in the event that this information contributes to an ultimate prosecution.
The updated CEP will also provide both individuals and companies with a structured framework to sidestep criminal charges by voluntarily reporting misconduct. Businesses that disclose previously unknown issues, cooperate fully, and work to address these problems in a reasonable timeframe without any additional complicating factors will receive a guaranteed declination, allowing them to avoid prosecution. This marks a shift from earlier policies that only offered a likelihood of prosecutorial leniency, while also leaving individual whistleblowers with reduced legal protections to avoid potential retaliation by the parties they were reporting on. Additionally, a new “partial compliance” tier allows companies that fall short of full disclosure requirements to secure a non-prosecution agreement with a maximum three-year term, no external monitor, and fines reduced by up to 75% from the lower end of federal guidelines. Galeotti, speaking on the new plan at a recent financial crimes summit, emphasized that the policy aims to “cut red tape that slows down American businesses.” The CEP also caps most corporate agreements at three years and allows for early closure of ongoing deals, easing the regulatory load placed on involved reporting firms.
Through these alterations, the DOJ is also seeking to cut costs and reduce its own deployment of excessive resources as they pertain to monitoring covered reporting companies. “Too often, businesses have been subject to unchecked and long-running investigations that can be costly – both to the department and to the subjects and targets of its investigations,” 3 Galeotti expanded, adding that the department will be reducing the use of corporate monitors responsible for driving up costs and disrupting operations for affected firms. New rules will limit when monitors will be required, with prosecutors now assessing factors like the likelihood of repeated offenses and the robustness of a company’s internal controls when making these decisions. If/when monitors are ultimately appointed, strict cost controls – including fee limits and mandatory budget reviews – will now apply.
All told the initiative seeks to better expose clandestine schemes across a number of settings. This includes the re-routing of goods through third-party (non-sanctioned or tariffed) countries to avoid new and established tariffs, which was highlighted due to the potential multi-billion dollar cost to the American economy that these activities bring about each year. All told, the DOJ’s reforms aim to boost compliance and public cooperation without over-burdening reporting firms, but questions remain about the potential for appropriate execution of these terms – with analysts speculating as to just how effective several of the program’s expansions (i.e. reporting of immigration violations) might be. While still awaiting comprehensive guidelines, this effort will undoubtedly require clear rules for validating tips, protecting informants, and preventing additional abuse. As the augmented whistleblower program nears its expected launch, its effectiveness will ultimately hinge on striking a balance between strong enforcement and reasonable reporting. As a plus for the financial sector, these changes should further incentivize companies to build adequate compliance programs and employ more robust internal reporting systems to better identify and manage misconduct and cases of potential fraud before their employees choose to blow the whistle.
Citations
1. “DOJ’s New White-Collar Crime Enforcement Strategy – What Global Corporations Need to Know.” Duane Morris LLP, 16 May 2025.
2. Kohn, Stephen. “The DOJ’s New Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program: A Victory for Wall Street – a Setback for Accountability.” Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto LLP, 5 Aug. 2024.
3. Michaels, Dave. “Justice Department to Reward Tipsters Reporting Immigration Violations, Tariff Cheats.” Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2025.